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Legal challenges posed by the war on 
drugs and the fight against organized 
crime in Colombia
Desafíos jurídicos planteados por la 
guerra contra las drogas y la lucha 
contra el crimen organizado en Colombia 
Abstract
This article aims to highlight the evolu-
tion of crime in Colombia and how it is 
a drawback to the current understand-
ing of the applicability of international 
humanitarian law. The peace agreement 
between the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia-FARC, the government and 
the emerging armed actors are a challenge 
to Colombian law and legal institutions. 
Accordingly, the article concluded that the 
use of force by the Colombian government 
against drug trafficking organizations, or 
so-called Criminal Gangs-BACRIM, does 
not seem to be the legal way to combat 
them since these organizations do not nec-
essarily participate in hostilities, which 
means that the government has to follow 
a specific procedure. 
Keywords: International humanitarian 
law; organized crime; armed conflict; gov-
ernment
Resumen
Este trabajo tiene como objeto exponer la evo-
lución del crimen en Colombia y como esta 
desafía la comprensión actual de la aplicabi-
lidad del derecho internacional humanitario. 
El acuerdo de paz entre las Fuerzas Arma-
das Revolucionarias de Colombia-FARC, el 
gobierno y los actores armados emergentes 
son un reto para el derecho y las institucio-
nes jurídicas colombianas. Luego del análisis 
de estos factores se concluye que el uso de 
la fuerza por parte del gobierno colombiano 
contra las organizaciones de narcotráfico, o 
las llamadas Bandas Criminales-BACRIM, 
no parece ser la forma legal para combatirlos, 
toda vez que estas organizaciones no necesa-
riamente participan en las hostilidades, lo 
cual significa que el estado tiene que seguir 
un procedimiento específico.
Palabras clave: Derecho internacional huma-
nitario; crimen organizado; conflicto armado; 
gobierno 
APPLYING A SPECIFIC CONTRACTUAL STRUCTURE IN FAVOR OF A THIRD 
PARTY TO A PASSENGER CARRIAGE CONTRACT
372
IntroductIon 
The existing international legal regimes regulating the use of force 
seem inappropriate to respond to the challenges posed by the fight 
against organized crime which is known in Latin America as the 
War on Drugs. On the one hand, International Human Rights Law 
(IHRL) does not adequately address situations where the state faces 
drug trafficking organizations with the ability to challenge state 
authority and control territory. On the other hand, International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) applies only in situations of armed conflict; 
despite the “War on Drugs” label and the increasing use of military 
forces therein, this remains primarily a law enforcement initiative in 
which a determination of whether IHL applies should depend on an 
analysis of each context where anti-drug activities are carried out. 
Colombia, and particularly the recent evolution of the situation, 
exemplifies all these challenges. The peace agreement between the 
government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - 
Ejército del Pueblo (FARC, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) 
has change the context, but other armed conflicts are still ongoing 
such as, for instance, with Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN, 
National Liberation Army). IHL regulate the use of force within 
these conflicts, however, there is a parallel fight against organiza-
tions called BACRIM that are not involve in hostilities and focus in 
drug trafficking or other type of illicit activities. 
Analysis conducted in the department of Antioquia, determined: 
A few years after the demobilization of the AUC new groups called 
BACRIMs (Bandas Criminals, Criminal Bands) emerged, some-
times described as a new generation of paramilitaries. While these 
groups are mostly composed of demobilized paramilitaries, they are 
not a direct reorganization of the paramilitaries —for instance, 
they are not receiving any state support— however, there are some 
similarities between the BACRIMs and their paramilitary pre-
decessors. Like the paramilitaries, the BACRIMs’ activities are 
closely related to drug trafficking, but they use violence to secure 
drug trafficking routes rather than having any counterinsurgency 
objective (Wienand y Tremaria, 2017, p. 38).
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As in armed conflict, human rights law complements IHL when 
it is appropriate. However, the reverse is not true: applying IHL 
in situations of peace (or internal tensions), when human rights 
law is the relevant authority, is inappropriate and endangers the 
protection of the population. This article discusses the definition of 
armed conflict, the classification of the situation in Colombia and 
specifically the definition of the fights against BACRIM, in order 
to conclude on the legality of the use force in different context. 
Methodology
This analysis is conducted through the theoretical and practical 
study of the norms of international humanitarian law and their 
application in cases, likewise, the study of the criminal policy 
of the Colombian state. It is a descriptive type of research since 
it illustrates the evolution and transformation that the armed 
actors in Colombia and the legal procedures for their sanction 
and combat.
defInItIon of arMed conflIct 
IHL is rooted in ancient civilization principles and custom sur-
rounding the warfare. The modern codification of IHL started in 
the nineteenth century and now represents a set of rules seeking 
to limit the effects of armed conflict, while acknowledging military 
requirements of States. IHL “protects persons who are not or are 
no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts the means 
and methods of warfare” (International Committee of the Red 
Cross-ICRC, 2004a). IHL applies only in armed conflict —after 
the conflict actually begun— and distinguishes between Interna-
tional Armed Conflict (IAC) and Non-International Armed Conflict 
(NIAC). IAC involved at least two states and NIAC are “restricted 
to the territory of a single State, involving either regular armed 
forces fighting groups of armed dissidents, or armed groups fighting 
each other” (ICRC, 2004a; Melzer, 2016, p. 66). 
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As IHL does not apply to international tension or disturbances, 
a recurrent problem is to differentiate internal tension to NIAC; 
because there is no definition of armed conflict in IHL and the dif-
ferentiation between those types of situation is left to a case-by-case 
study. In some opportunities international courts have developed 
jurisprudence on the matter. They state that two conditions are 
to be met to determine if a situation is one of armed conflict: The 
intensity of the conflict and the organization of the parties (Vité, 
2009). For instance, the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY, 1997) first stated:
The test applied by the Appeals Chamber to the existence of an 
armed conflict for the purposes of the rules contained in Common 
Article 3 focuses on two aspects of a conflict; the intensity of the 
conflict and the organization of the parties to the conflict. In an 
armed conflict of an internal [...] character, these closely related 
criteria are used solely for the purpose, as a minimum, of distin-
guishing an armed conflict from banditry, unorganized and short-
lived insurrections, or terrorist activities, which are not subject to 
international humanitarian law [...] (p. 562).
The Tribunal reiterated the same two conditions (ICTY, 2005): 
Determination of the existence of an armed conflict is based solely 
on two criteria: the intensity of the conflict and organization of the 
parties, the purpose of the armed forces to engage in acts of vio-
lence or also achieve some further objective is, therefore, irrelevant 
(ICTY, 2005, n. 23. par. 170; Vité, 2009, p. 78). 
The intensity of the conflict can be analyzed through an examina-
tion of factors including the duration of the conflict, the frequency of 
the acts of violence and military operations, and the nature of the 
weapons used. Meanwhile, the organization of the parties is often 
evaluated by considering whether or not at least one-armed group 
has a chain of command (Vité, 2009).
And, the ICTY (2004), in a case within its jurisdiction, exposes: 
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Further details can be found in the Milosevic case. The Chamber 
found the existence of an armed conflict because the Kosovo Libera-
tion Army “conducted many operations against the police, including 
killing people who had been employees of the police and those who 
had cooperated with the police, amounting to about 20 persons in 
1997.” Explaining that both parties were using weapons, including 
rifles, guns, and mortars (pp. 28–31). 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has devel-
oped these criteria, which even though the interpretation of the ICRC 
is not binding it offers guidance on how to interpret IHL. It identifies 
a Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC) in the following terms:
In general, in non-international armed conflict: nongovernmental 
armed groups fight either among themselves or against governmen-
tal forces; with a level of intensity exceeding that of isolated and 
sporadic acts of violence; and with a level of collective organization 
enabling them to carry out sustained and concerted operations. In 
addition, the armed groups may also exercise a certain minimum 
control over the territory. Exercising such control entails no change 
in the status of the parties, but it does determine which legal instru-
ments are applicable (Vité, 2009, p. 75–76).
And interpreting Article 1(2) of Additional Protocol II and Com-
mon Article 3, the ICRC states: 
First, the hostilities must reach a minimum level of intensity. This 
may be the case, for example, when the hostilities are of a collective 
character or when the government is obliged to use military force 
against the insurgents, instead of mere police forces. Second, non-
governmental groups involved in the conflict must be considered as 
“parties to the conflict,” meaning that they possess organized armed 
forces. This means for example that these forces have to be under a 
certain command structure and have the capacity to sustain mili-
tary operations (ICRC, 2014).
Following current international jurisprudence and doctrine 
only two criteria —intensity of violence and organization of armed 
groups— to classifies a situation of violence as an armed conflict. 
APPLYING A SPECIFIC CONTRACTUAL STRUCTURE IN FAVOR OF A THIRD 
PARTY TO A PASSENGER CARRIAGE CONTRACT
376
The subsequent part will analyze firs the Mexican War on Drugs 
and then the Colombian upcoming armed conflict using the light of 
those criteria. 
coloMbIa: 
froM arMed conflIct to the fIght agaInst organIzed crIMe 
The history of violence in Colombia is long and complex. 
The presence of various organized armed groups, the intensity of 
the violence, and the duration of the conflict make the classification 
of the situation as an armed conflict unproblematic, and the NIAC 
has been recognized for many years now. The peace process and 
the signature of an historical agreement in August 2016 ended the 
confrontation between the FARC and the Colombian government. 
However, several NIAC continue to exist between the government 
and several armed groups (Padilla & Bermúdez, 2016, pp. 201–202). 
In this section we will not focus on the long time and ongoing 
NIAC but on the fight against criminal bands which, until May 
2016 were not considered as organized armed groups and there was 
no armed conflict between the Colombian government and these 
criminal bands. In May 2016 the Colombian government changed its 
strategy to fight them and declare that it will bombs some criminal 
groups (called BACRIM for Bandas Criminals, [Criminal Band]), 
arguing IHL applies because those groups are organized armed 
groups
The Colombian government uses the pretext of applying IHL to 
justify the use of military forces. By doing so, Colombian state simply 
ignore the fact that there are no previous hostilities between the gov-
ernment and the BACRIM, which mean the situation does not met 
the requirement to be classified as an armed conflict. By extension, 
acting undermines the rule of law. This section explores the recent 
evolution of the fight against the BACRIM in Colombia illustrating 
the argument that the implementation of the law enforcement initia-
tive, namely the War on Drugs, is contrary to existing international 
law (Perret, 2014). 
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coloMbIan arMed conflIct 
For sixty years, Colombia has experienced an armed conflict, which 
is usually considered as a NIAC (Nieto, 2008). Although the Uribe 
government (2002-2010) long tried to deny the armed conflict, call-
ing the situation a “fight against terrorism,” the current administra-
tion has recognized the existence of a conflict (Semana, 2011, p. 1). 
Indeed, it is easily characterized as a situation of armed conflict due 
to the presence of several organized armed groups with a responsible 
command which control some parts of the territory —for instance, 
the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolution-
ary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC), the Ejército de Liberación 
Nacional (National Liberation Army, ELN), or the new generation 
of paramilitaries— as well as the intensity of violence against the 
state and civilians (Massé, 2011). In September 2012, the Colombian 
government and the FARC started to negotiate the end of the armed 
conflict and signed a peace agreement in August 2016 (Semana, 
2012; Republic of Colombia & FARC-EP, 2016). Nevertheless, the 
armed conflict is still ongoing. The ICRC still identifies at least 
five ongoing armed conflict in Colombia: 1) The National Liberation 
Army (ELN); 2) the Gulf Clan; 3) the EPL (Popular Liberation 
Army); 4) FARC dissidents, specifically Front 1, 7 and 40; 5) clashes 
between ELN and EPL (EL País, 2019). 
Then, IHL (Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II) applies 
to the Colombian NIAC. 
organIzatIon and hIstory of the bacrIM
The question of their structure and classification as part of the 
NIAC is not new. Before the Colombian government proclaimed 
them organized armed groups in May 2016, several organizations 
suggested that BACRIM should be considered part of the ongoing 
NIAC. Reacting on the 2012 on a legal framework for peace outlin-
ing the terms of a possible peace negotiation, which excluded the 
BACRIMs from the framework, because criminals are not part of the 
Colombian armed conflict (Pérez-Santiago, 2012), organization such 
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as International Crisis Group (ICG, 2007) or Human Rights Watch 
(HRW, 2010) suggested that certain BACRIM meets the require-
ment to be considered part of the armed conflict. Even the Defensor 
del Pueblo —principal public official responsible for the protection of 
human rights in Colombia— declared that some BACRIM have suf-
ficient structure and command authority and structure to constitute 
illegal armed groups under IHL (El Espectador, 2012; El Tiempo, 
2012). As their current organization and activities is built through 
their history it is necessary to go back in history. 
After a failed attempt of peace negotiation with guerilla group 
FARC between 1998 and 2012, the following administration of presi-
dent Uribe (2002-2010) chose a different tactic. On the one hand, 
the administration strongly attacked the guerrillas and increased 
its cooperation with the US (Rojas, 2013). And on the other hand, 
it negotiated with the AUC and managed to demobilize most of the 
paramilitary forces (Grajales, 2011). A few years after the demobili-
zation of the AUC new groups called BACRIMs emerged, sometimes 
described as a new generation of paramilitaries (Granada, Restrepo, 
& Tobón, 2009; Massé, 2010). While these groups are mostly com-
posed of demobilized paramilitaries, they are not a direct reorgani-
zation of the paramilitaries —for instance, they are not receiving 
any state support— however, there are some similarities between 
the BACRIMs and their paramilitary predecessors (Rico, 2013). 
Like the paramilitaries, the BACRIMs’ activities are closely related 
to drug trafficking, but they use violence to secure drug trafficking 
routes rather than having any counterinsurgency objective (Arias 
& Restrepo, 2010).
The evolution of BACRIMs —and their structure— has been 
marked by alliance, pacts, and fights between them and with/
against guerilla groups such as FARC and ELN, “They went from 
22 small armed structures with local presence in 2007, to 5 criminal 
networks articulating actions by a number of local armed franchises 
in 14% of Colombia’s municipalities by 2013” (Massé & Munévar, 
2017, pp. 12–13). 
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As Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs), Colombian 
narco-traffickers have adapted to new realities. They are no longer 
family business or integrated organizations but work as networks. 
They have also adapted their structure depending the environment 
and their necessity: in rural regions, such as the department of 
Cauca, their structure is more hierarchically with a purpose of 
“direct combat and coordinated military actions” while in urban 
areas they rely on local street gangs to exercise violence on their 
behalf (McDermott, 2014, p. 4). A similar comment made on Mexican 
DTOs can be made for Colombian BACRIM a network of cells and 
is not necessarily synonym of poorly organized group.
The most powerful groups are the Urabeños (Autodefensas Gai-
tanistas de Colombia), Rastrojos, ERPAC, and Águilas Negras. The 
Colombian forces have constantly attacked the BACRIM targeting 
and vanishing their original leadership (United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees-UNHCR, 2015) However, they maintain 
over 2,500 men (or 10,000 depending of the estimation) and their 
structure and traffic are intact. Their military capacity has also 
been maintained strong. Insight Crime considers that they are: 
Upon highly trained and well-armed units, often made up of for-
mer members of the security forces. These units are able to carry 
out conventional military actions, have specialized weaponry and 
explosives skills. Some BACRIM can carry out these operations 
internationally (McDermott, 2014, p. 1). 
By 2009, the combined military capacity of these groups exceeded 
that of Colombia’s FARC rebels, executing double the total number 
of militant actions (Romero & Arias, 2010).
However, even though there is no doubt they are well armed (with 
automatic and heavy weapons) their willingness to fight —either 
the state or guerrilla groups— is no evident. BACRIM have control 
of “rural areas suitable for the manufacturing or transportation of 
cocaine and impoverished zones in cities such as Medellin” where the 
state has not a lot of interests (Attanasio, 2013). Then confrontations 
are not common which raise question about the intensity of violence 
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to classify the situation as an armed conflict between the state and 
the BACRIM.
IntensIty of the confrontatIon between 
bacrIM and coloMbIan governMent 
As mentioned before, the intensity of an armed conflict can be 
analyzed through an examination of factors including the duration 
of the conflict, the frequency of the acts of violence and military 
operations, and the nature of the weapons used (Vité, 2009). It also 
has been said that the BACRIM exist since the process of the demo-
bilization of the paramilitaries (2005), which mean that the duration 
of the potential conflict is met. As BACRIM inherits directly from 
paramilitaries groups they have kept heavy weapons and military 
techniques. However, the frequency of the acts of violence and mili-
tary operations is subject to debate. 
In January 2014, the International Criminal Court (ICC) stated 
that the BACRIM group Urabeños had reached a level that merits 
monitoring. The group is organized enough and “could become part 
of the armed civil conflict” but the current level of conflict between 
the BACRIM and the state forces, or the BACRIM and the guerril-
las is not “sufficiently intense” to be considered an armed conflict 
(Barón & Gómez, 2015, p. 41). Then, the question is if the intensity 
of the confrontation between the state and the BACRIM groups has 
increased in the past 2 years. 
First looking at the state initiative against BACRIM groups, 
polices forces mostly lead the operations against those groups. Even 
though Colombian police is highly militarized, the difference exist 
and make sense as —until May 2016— BACRIM were not consid-
ered as part of the armed conflict. In a similar vein the use of force 
by Colombian army depend on the classification of the situation as 
law enforcement or combat. “They distinguish between two kinds 
of operations: first, operations during hostile scenarios (Operaciones 
en escenarios de hostilidades) and second, operations to maintain 
security (Operaciones para el mantenimiento de la seguridad)” (Von, 
2011, p. 160).
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Until May 2016, operations against BACRIM were considered 
as law enforcement. Many operations leads to arrest BACRIM 
members, as well as drugs and weapons, successfully. For instance, 
between 2009 and 2015 “around 6,700 members of the Urabeños 
have been arrested, with authorities seizing 2,282 weapons, 55 tons 
of drugs, and around $26.2 million from the group” (Lohmuller, 
2015, p. 1). Some of those operations include military personnel and 
equipment, as it was the case for missions against the leaders of the 
Urabeños: “over 20 Black Hawk helicopters and 1,200 police and 
military officers have been sent to support the mission in Uraba” 
(Semana, 2015, p. 1).
From the side of the BACRIM fewer examples are available. The 
lack of data on the subject is disturbing in Colombia (several public 
entities recollect statistic on the conflict and related violence)1. The 
few data available reports “during the period from 2006 to 2008, 
55% [BACRIM] group activities were offensive actions, 26% were 
threats, and only 12% were combat with public forces” (Perret, 
2014, p. 136). Then the data are anecdotal: in 2012, the Urabeños 
showed their capacity to coordinated actions organizing an armed or 
enforced strike (paro armado); however, even though they succeed in 
showing their capacity there were no hostilities. Another potential 
example happened in September 2014, when the Colombian govern-
ment suspected Urabeños (alongside with FARC) to be responsible 
for an attack on police forces which left seven killed (Janes, 2014).
Considering the fact that these examples are scattered in time, not 
necessarily intense, and the number of victims is not comparable to 
any other armed conflict situation it is hard to consider that there is 
an armed conflict opposing the Colombian government to BACRIM 
groups. The situation is more likely a situation of the government 
fighting organized crime and the law governing this situation is 
human rights law and not international humanitarian law as the 
Colombian government have stated.
1  Several interviews to academics and officials suggest that there is no data on the 
question.
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conclusIons: consIderatIon on the use of force 
The law of NIAC allows targeting members of an armed group 
during the hostilities and, if they have a continuous fighting func-
tion, “not only while directly participating in hostilities through 
specific acts but also […] as long as they do not fall into the power 
of the enemy or are otherwise hors de combat” (Sassoli, Bouvier & 
Quintin, 2011, p. 235). Therefore, to know if the drug traffickers or 
BACRIM member can be lawful targets, it is necessary to identify 
them as members of an armed group who are participating directly 
in hostilities or who have a continuous fighting function.
In a NIAC, is it difficult to distinguish members of an armed 
group from the population: “you can’t easily distinguish a group of 
ordinary people doing their ordinary business from armed groups. 
In an insurgency, you are dealing with civilian-clothed opponents” 
(BBC, 2010, p. 1). IHL of NIAC does not provide any elements of 
definition of members of armed groups2, and the definition of “com-
batant” and “civilian” provided in the law of IAC3 is not helpful 
because “[t]he distinction between the first and the second category 
… is a negative one: all persons who are not combatants are civil-
ians” (ICRC, 2004b, p. 8). 
Although there is no real definition of “civilian,” it is generally 
accepted that civilians are people “who are neither members of 
state armed forces nor of organized armed groups and who do not 
otherwise participate in hostilities” (Melzer, 2005, p. 13). Apply-
ing this last definition to BACRIM member in Colombia, or drug 
traffickers and considering that armed groups in a NIAC are not 
easily identifiable, the potential affiliation of drug traffickers to 
the BACRIM depends whether they directly participate in the 
hostilities. 
2  The only reference to this distinction is in which asserts that, “persons taking no 
active part in the hostilities … be treated humanely” (ICRC, 1949, art. 3). 
3  ICRC, 2014, Additional Protocol I arts. 43(1), 50(1).
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In the wording of the ICRC, “the notion direct participation in 
hostilities refers to specific acts carried out by individuals as part 
of the conduct of hostilities between parties to an armed conflict” 
(Melzer, 2009, p. 70). Hostilities should be understood as “offensive 
or defensive acts and military operations” in an armed conflict 
(Quéguiner, 2003, p. 11).
IHL permits, under certain circumstances, the targeted killing 
of individuals supporting the parties to an armed conflict, workers 
in ammunition factories, for example (Sassoli, 2003, p. 9). Thus, 
the remaining question is if the activities of drug trafficking and 
financial support to an armed group can be considered direct par-
ticipation in hostilities.
The distinction between whether certain activities might be con-
sidered as a direct participation has been subject to extensive debate 
(Melzer, 2005). For instance, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (IACHR) explains:
Indirect participation, such as selling goods to one or more of the 
armed parties, expressing sympathy for the cause of one of the par-
ties or, even more clearly, failing to act to prevent an incursion by 
one of the armed parties, does not involve acts of violence which 
pose an immediate threat of actual harm to the adverse party (OAS, 
IACHR, 1999).
Providing food and clothing to fighters, for example, is not direct 
participation because it does not “pose an immediate threat of actual 
harm to the adverse party” (Melzer, 2005, p. 21). Similarly, drug 
trafficking —transportation and sale of narcotics— does not in and 
of itself represent a threat to the “adverse party”. Nevertheless, the 
revenue from drug trafficking could enable traffickers to provide 
financial support to a party of the armed conflict.
To conclude, most of the BACRIM are not part of the Colombian 
armed conflict and cannot be targeted to be killed but should benefi-
ciate of civil protection in an armed conflict unless they participate 
in hostilities. The law governing the fights aginst BACRIM is 
human rights law and not international humanitarian law as the 
Colombian government have stated.
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